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The Supreme Court of Canada has said that Aboriginal rights were recognized
and affirmed in the Canadian Constitution in 1982 in order to reconcile
Aboriginal peoples'prior occupation of Canada with the Crown's assertion of
sovereignty. However, sharp divisions appeared in the Court in the 1990s over
how this reconciliation is to be achieved Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority,
understood reconciliation to involve the balancing of Aboriginal rights with the
interests of other Canadians. In some situations, he thought this could justify the
infringement of Aboriginal rights to achieve, for example, economic and
regional fairness. Justice McLachlin, on the other hand, in strongly worded
dissent, regarded infringement for such purposes as unconstitutional. In her
opinion, reconciliation can best be achieved through negotiation and the time-
honoured process of treaty making.
Kent McNeil teaches at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto and is the author of numerous works
on the rights of Indigenous peoples in Canada, Australia and the United States. He has also served as
a consultant to several First Nations in Canada. His book, Common Law Aboriginal Title (1989), has
been influential in landmark decisions on Indigenous rights. A recent collection of his critical essays,
Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (2001), received two
Saskatchewan Book Awards. The author expresses gratitude to Michael Burke for his indispensable
research assistance with this article.
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This article will critically examine the contrasting notions of reconciliation
of former Chief Justice Lamer and current Chief Justice McLachlin. It will
explain why Chief Justice McLachlin 's understanding is preferable, and express
the hope that the Court, under her leadership, will modify the Lamer Court's
approach tojustifiable infringement.
I INTRODUCTION
The notion of reconciliation as a legal concept affecting the relationship between
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada and the Crown appears to have originated with
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights by s.35(l) of the
Constitution Act, 1982.' In its first decision interpreting and applying s.35(1), the
Supreme Court of Canada, in the unanimous judgment delivered by Dickson C.J.
and La Forest J. in R. v. Sparrow, said this:
There is no explicit language in the provision [s.35(1)] that authorizes this Court or
any court to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that restricts
[A]boriginal rights. Yet, we find that the words "recognition and affirmation"
incorporate the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint
on the exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not
absolute. Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to
legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s.91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
These powers must, however, now be read together with s.35(l). In other words,
federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that
reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that
infringes upon or denies [A]boriginal rights.'
The Court then went on to lay down what is known as the Sparrow test for
justification of infringement of Aboriginal rights, requiring the federal
government to prove both a valid legislative objective and respect for the
Crown's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples.
The concept of reconciliation that the Supreme Court had in mind in
Sparrow, therefore, seems to relate to the impact of constitutional recognition
and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights on the legislative authority of the
Parliament of Canada. Parliament still has legislative power in relation to those
rights,' but the exercise of that power will be scrutinized by the courts to ensure
1. Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.l. Section 35(1) provides: "The existing
[A]boriginal and treaty rights of the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed."
2. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1109 [hereinafter Sparrow][emphasis added].
3. It is important to note that this authority is vested in Parliament, not in the executive branch of the
federal government. In R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 at para. 54, Lamer C.J. pointed out that, for
an infringement by the executive to be valid, Parliament would have had to delegate specific
authority containing definite guidelines to it:
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that it is exercised only for compelling and substantial legislative objectives in
ways that are consistent with the honour of the Crown and its fiduciary
obligations.' In the specific context of the Aboriginal right to fish for food,
societal and ceremonial purposes that was at issue in Sparrow, this meant that
after the valid legislative objective of conservation had been met, Parliament had
to give the Aboriginal fishing right complete priority over fishing for
commercial and sport purposes. Reconciliation did not involve taking account of
the interests of non-Aboriginal users in the allocation of the fishery resource.
The issue of reconciliation in the context of Aboriginal fishing rights was
revisited by the Supreme Court in 1996 in what has become known as the Van
der Peet trilogy. Of these three cases, R. v. Van der Peet' is the leading decision
on the test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights (apart from Aboriginal
title to land6) and R. v. Gladstone7 is the leading post-Sparrow decision on
justification of infringements of Aboriginal rights.8 In these cases, the then Chief
Justice, Antonio Lamer, and the current Chief Justice, Beverley McLachlin,
differed significantly on the meaning and application of the concept of
reconciliation. This article will analyze and compare their respective views and
show how Chief Justice McLachlin's understanding of reconciliation is more in
In light of the Crown's unique fiduciary obligations towards [A]boriginal peoples,
Parliament may not simply adopt an unstructured discretionary administrative regime
which risks infringing [A]boriginal rights in a substantial number of applications in the
absence of some specific guidance. If a statute confers an administrative discretion which
may carry significant consequences for the exercise of an [Aiboriginal right, the statute or
its delegate regulations must outline specific criteria for the granting or refusal of that
discretion which seek to accommodate the existence of [Alboriginal rights. In the absence
of such specific guidance, the statute will fail to provide representatives of the Crown
with sufficient directives to fulfil their fiduciary duties, and the statute will be found to
represent an infringement of [A]boriginal rights under the Sparrow test.
A fortiori, administrative or executive action that is unsupported by legislative authority will be
incapable of infringing Aboriginal rights: see note 61. See also R. v. Marshall [No. 1], [1999] 3
S.C.R. 456 at para. 64 [hereinafter Marshall [No. 1]] and R. v. Marshall [No. 2], [1999] 3 S.C.R.
533 at para. 33 [hereinafter Marshall [No. 2]], where the Court quoted this passage from Adams and
applied it to treaty rights.
4. For critical commentary on this continuing legislative authority, see Kent McNeil, "Envisaging
Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 95, reprinted in Kent
McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 184 [hereinafter Emerging Justice]. See also
Gordon Christie, "Judicial Justification of Recent Developments in Aboriginal Law" (2002) 17
C.J.L.S. 41.
5. [199612 S.C.R. 507 [hereinafter Van derPeet].
6. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw], the Court
took a different approach to definition and proof of Aboriginal title: see notes 84-85 and
accompanying text and Kent McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90's: Has the Supreme Court
Finally Got It Right? (Toronto: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University, 1998)
[hereinafter Defining Aboriginal].
7. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter Gladstone].
8. The other decision in the trilogy, R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672, will not be
discussed in this article because reconciliation was not mentioned in it.
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keeping with the constitutional principles that should govern the relationship
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.
II CHIEF JUSTICE LAMER'S VIEWS
The Van der Peet case involved prosecution of Dorothy Van der Peet, a member
of the Sto:lo Nation in British Columbia, for violation of the federal Fisheries
Act.' Ms. Van der Peet had sold ten salmon that had been caught by her common
law partner and his brother under the authority of an Indian food fish licence. In
defence, she asserted an Aboriginal right to sell the salmon and relied on s.35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982. In rejecting this defence, Chief Justice Lamer,
speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court, laid down the following test for
identifying and defining Aboriginal rights:
[I]n order to be an [A]boriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice,
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the [A]boriginal group
claiming the right.' °
The time at which this "integral to the distinctive culture" test is applied is
immediately prior to contact between the Aboriginal people in question and
Europeans." As Ms. Van der Peet "failed to demonstrate that the exchange of
fish for money or other goods was an integral part of the distinctive Sto:lo
society which existed prior to contact,"'2 the Supreme Court held that she had not
proven her Aboriginal right, and so was guilty as charged.
It is not my intention to reiterate the many legitimate criticisms that have
already been directed at the "integral to the distinctive culture" test. 3 Instead, I
want to focus on Chief Justice Lamer's re-interpretation in Van der Peet of the
concept of reconciliation that first appeared in Canadian Aboriginal rights law in
Sparrow. Applying a "purposive analysis" to s.35(l), Lamer C.J. said this:
[W]hat s.35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through which the fact
that [A]boriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices,
traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of the
Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in
light of this purpose; the [A]boriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.35(1)
9. R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
10. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 46.
11. Ibid. at paras. 60-67. See also R. v. Adams, supra note 3 at paras. 37-46; R. v. Cdtg, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
139 at paras. 58-68.
12. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 9 1.
13. See e.g. Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, "The Supreme Court's Van der
Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993; Catherine Bell,
"New Directions in the Law of Aboriginal Rights" (1998) 77 Can. Bar Rev. 36; John Borrows,
Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002) at 56-76.
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must be directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of [A]boriginal
societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.4
For the Chief Justice, then, the reconciliation that s.35(l) was designed to
achieve related both to the pre-contact origins of Aboriginal rights and to the
legislative authority over those rights that accompanied Crown acquisition of
sovereignty.'5 In both respects, reconciliation appears to operate to the
disadvantage of the Aboriginal peoples.'6
In the introduction to his analysis in Van der Peet, Lamer C.J. said that the
"task of this Court is to define Aboriginal rights in a manner which recognizes
that Aboriginal rights are rights but which does so without losing sight of the
fact that they are rights held by Aboriginal people because they are
Aboriginal."'7 He distinguished Aboriginal rights from rights guaranteed by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because the latter are held by all
members of Canadian society, whereas the former are held only by Aboriginal
peoples:
The Court must neither lose sight of the generalized constitutional status of what
s.35(1) protects, nor can it ignore the necessary specificity which comes from
granting special constitutional protection to one part of Canadian society ... [A]
purposive approach to s.35(1) will ensure that that which is found to fall within the
provision is related to the provision's intended focus: Aboriginal peoples and their
rights in relation to Canadian society as a whole. 8
This passage reveals that, while the rights that are recognized and affirmed by
s.35(l) are those that were already in existence when the section was enacted, 9
14. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 31 [emphasis added]. Lamer C.J. went on to find support for his
conception of reconciliation in American and Australian law, as well as in academic commentary in
Canada: ibid. at paras. 36-43.
15. The Supreme Court has deftly avoided the issue of how Crown sovereignty could have been acquired
without Aboriginal consent. For critical commentary, see Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem,
"Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev.
498; John Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537; Michael Asch, "First Nations and the Derivation of Canada's
Underlying Title: Comparing Perspectives on Legal Ideology" in Curtis Cook and Juan D. Lindau,
eds., Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government: The Canadian and Mexican Experience in North
American Perspective (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) 148.
16. While Lamer C.J. said that true reconciliation will place equal weight on Aboriginal and common
law perspectives on Aboriginal rights (Van der Peet, supra note 5 at paras. 49-50), the formulation of
the "integral to the distinctive culture" test in Van der Peet and its application in other cases such as
R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 and Mitchell v. MN.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, reveal how little
Aboriginal perspectives really count: see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to
Land to Territorial Sovereignty" (1998) 5 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 253, at 261-62, 265, 292-93
[hereinafter "Aboriginal Rights"], reprinted in Emerging Justice, supra note 4, 58 at 66-67, 69-70,
96-97.
17. Van der Peet, ibid. at para. 20 [emphasis in original].
18. Ibid. at paras. 20-21.
19. See Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1091; Van der Peet, ibid. at para. 28.
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constitutional recognition is somehow relevant (illogical as this may seem) to the
definition of the rights because of "the necessary specificity which comes from
granting special constitutional protection to one part of Canadian society."20 So it
appears that, for Lamer C.J., constitutional recognition was a reason for
restricting Aboriginal rights to practices, customs and traditions that were truly
"Aboriginal," that is, that were central to distinctive Aboriginal societies as they
existed prior to contact with Europeans.' The interests of reconciliation would
not be served, in his opinion, by providing constitutional protection to practices,
customs and traditions that were not crucial elements of those societies or that
arose after contact.
2
As a majority of the Supreme Court found that Dorothy Van der Peet had
not established her Aboriginal right to exchange fish, Chief Justice Lamer did
not deal with the issue of justifiable infringement of Aboriginal rights in Van der
Peet. That issue, however, did figure prominently in the Court's decision in
Gladstone,23 delivered the same day as Van der Peet. Donald and William
Gladstone, who are members of the Heiltsuk Nation in British Columbia, had
been charged under the Fisheries Act2" with illegally attempting to sell herring
spawn on kelp. They claimed an Aboriginal right to sell the herring spawn and,
unlike Ms. Van der Peet, were able to prove it to the satisfaction of a majority of
the Supreme Court by meeting the "integral to the distinctive culture" test. The
Crown failed to show that this right had been extinguished. As the appellants
were able to demonstrate that their Aboriginal right to take and sell herring
spawn on kelp in commercial quantities had been infringed by the Fisheries Act
20. Van der Peet, ibid. at para. 20 [emphasis added]; see also para. 29.
21. See ibid at para. 44:
In order to fulfil the purpose underlying s.35(l)-i.e., the protection and reconciliation of
the interests which arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North
America [A]boriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own
practices, customs and traditions-the test for identifying the [A]boriginal rights
recognized and affirmed by s.35(1) must be directed at identifying the crucial elements of
those pre-existing distinctive societies. It must, in other words, aim at identifying the
practices, traditions and customs central to the [A]boriginal societies that existed in North
America prior to contact with the Europeans.
See also ibid. at para. 57. For critical analysis, see the works cited supra note 13.
22. Lamer C.J. claimed, nonetheless, that he was not adopting a "frozen rights" approach, as pre-contact
practices, customs and traditions could be modified to meet changing conditions as long as sufficient
continuity was maintained: Van der Peet, supra note 5 at paras. 62-64. L'Heureux-Dubd J., in her
dissenting opinion, forcefully disagreed: ibid. at paras. 164-79.
23. Supra note 7.
24. Supra note 9.
25. For valuable commentary, see Douglas C. Harris, "Territoriality, Aboriginal Rights, and the Heiltsuk
Spawn-on-Kelp Fishery" (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 195.
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and regulations made under it, a majority of the Court turned to the issue of
justification of the infringement.26
The majority judgment in Gladstone was also authored by Chief Justice
Lamer. After outlining the test laid down in Sparrow for justification of
infringement of Aboriginal rights, he said that, as the framework for analyzing
Aboriginal rights depends on the legal and factual context, "it will be necessary
to revisit the Sparrow test and to adapt the justification test it lays out in order to
apply that test to the circumstances of this appeal."27 He found that the
circumstances of Gladstone differed from those of Sparrow in two significant
ways.
First, the Aboriginal fishing right in Sparrow was limited to fishing for food,
societal and ceremonial purposes, whereas the right in Gladstone was a full-
blown commercial right. While the former was limited internally by the quantity
of fish that could be consumed by the Aboriginal community, the latter had no
internal limit-it was subject only to "the external constraints of the demand of
the market and the availability of the resource."28 For Lamer C.J., this meant that
the complete priority after conservation that had been accorded to the fishing
right in Sparrow could not apply to the commercial right established in
Gladstone, as "to give priority to [the latter] right in the manner suggested in
Sparrow would be to give the right-holder exclusivity over any person not
having an [A]boriginal right to participate in the herring spawn on kelp
fishery."29 For this reason, the Chief Justice modified the way priority operates in
a commercial context:
Where the [A]boriginal right is one that has no internal limitation then the doctrine
of priority does not require that, after conservation goals have been met, the
government allocate the fishery so that those holding an [A]boriginal right to exploit
that fishery on a commercial basis are given an exclusive right to do so. Instead, the
doctrine of priority requires that the government demonstrate that, in allocating the
resource, it has taken account of the existence of [A]boriginal rights and allocated
the resource in a manner respectful of the fact that those rights have priority over the
exploitation of the fishery by other users. This right is at once both procedural and
substantive: at the stage of justification the government must demonstrate both that
26. La Forest J., dissenting, was of the view that the appellants had not established their Aboriginal right,
but had they done so he would have found it to have been extinguished. He was therefore able to
avoid the justification issue entirely. L'Heureux-Dubd J. and McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote
judgments in which they concurred that a new trial was necessary. L'Heureux-Dubd J. agreed with
the majority on the issue of justification, whereas McLachlin J. avoided this issue by concluding that
a new trial was needed to determine whether the Aboriginal right had been infringed: see notes 38-39
and accompanying text.
27. Gladstone, supra note 7 at para. 56.
28. Ibid. at para. 57.
29. Ibid. at para. 59. Lamer C.J. however, could have avoided this perceived problem of a monopoly in
another, more appropriate way, namely by limiting the exercise of the Heiltsuk's right to harvest
herring spawn on kelp to their traditional fishing grounds: see Harris, supra note 25, esp. at 229-30.
See also note 38.
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the process by which it allocated the resource and the actual allocation of the
resource which results from that process reflect the prior interest of [A]boriginal
rights holders in the fishery."
However, Lamer C.J. admitted that "[t]he content of this priority-something
less than exclusivity but which nonetheless gives priority to the [A]boriginal
right-must remain somewhat vague pending consideration of the government's
actions in specific cases."'
The second significant difference that Lamer C.J. saw between Gladstone
and Sparrow was that, unlike Sparrow, the circumstances of Gladstone involved
legislative objectives that went beyond conservation. Once conservation goals
had been met, the government still had to allocate the herring resource among
the various users. This led the Chief Justice to consider what kinds of objectives,
in addition to conservation, might be sufficiently compelling and substantial to
justify infringement. In doing so, he referred to the purposive approach to s.35(l)
and the concept of reconciliation that he relied upon in Van der Peet, and then
went on to observe:
In the context of the objectives which can be said to be compelling and substantial
under the first branch of the Sparrow justification test, the import of these purposes
is that the objectives which can be said to be compelling and substantial will be
those directed at either the recognition of the prior occupation of North America by
[A]boriginal peoples or-and at the level of justification it is this purpose which
may well be most relevant-at the reconciliation of [A]boriginal prior occupation
with the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.32
At the justification stage of the analysis, reconciliation therefore provided Lamer
C.J. with a rationale for expanding the range of legislative objectives that could
meet the compelling and substantial requirement laid down in Sparrow. He said:
Because ... distinctive [A]boriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader
social, political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there
are circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and
substantial importance to that community as a whole (taking into account the fact
that [A]boriginal societies are a part of that community), some limitation of those
rights will be justifiable. Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation
of [A]boriginal societies with the broader political community of which they are
part; limits placed on those rights are, where the objectives furthered by those limits
are of sufficient importance to the broader community as a whole, equally a
necessary part of that reconciliation.3
30. Gladstone, supra note 7 at para. 62.
31. Ibid. at para. 63. Lamer C.J. however, did outline some of the factors that should be considered in
determining whether the government had shown sufficient respect for the Aboriginal right: see ibid.
at para. 64.
32. Ibid. at para. 72 [emphasis added].
33. Ibid. at para. 73 [emphasis in original].
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After using conservation as an example of a legislative objective that achieves
this goal of reconciliation, the Chief Justice went on to suggest objectives
involving allocation of the fisheries resource that might also justify infringement
of Aboriginal rights:
Although by no means making a definitive statement on this issue, I would suggest
that with regards to distribution of the fisheries resource after conservation goals
have been met, objectives such as the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and
the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by
non-[A]boriginal groups, are the type of objectives which can (at least in the right
circumstances) satisfy this standard. In the right circumstances, such objectives are
in the interest of all Canadians and, more importantly, the reconciliation of
[A]boriginal societies with the rest of Canadian society may well depend on their
successful attainment.34
In this passage, I think an important aspect of Lamer C.J.'s conception of
reconciliation is revealed: Aboriginal rights, even though they are
constitutionally protected, might have to give way to the interests of other
Canadians in order to achieve vague goals like "economic and regional fairness."
Moreover, in determining whether allocation of a resource in a way that
infringes Aboriginal rights is justified, courts can take account of historical, non-
Aboriginal use of the resource. In other words, past violations of Aboriginal
rights by non-Aboriginal persons apparently can be used to justify continuing
infringements of those rights today. 5 The reason why this is permissible appears
to be that "successful attainment" of reconciliation "may well depend" on this
kind of balancing of rights and interests. In this context, reconciliation appears to
relate more to the maintenance of established economic interests than to the
protection of constitutional rights.36
In Gladstone, Lamer C.J. did not have to go beyond the general framework
he laid down for justifying infringements of Aboriginal rights in the context of
allocation of fishery resources because no evidence had been presented at trial
on this issue. He therefore ordered a new trial to determine whether the
34. Ibid. at para. 75 [emphasis in original].
35. To be constitutionally recognized in 1982, we have seen that Aboriginal rights have to meet the
"integral to the distinctive culture" test: see notes 10-11 and accompanying text. This means that they
must have originated from pre-contact Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions, and must not
have been extinguished prior to the enactment of s.35(l). As the Aboriginal rights must have been in
existence when non-Aboriginal persons began to use the resources to which those rights relate,
historical non-Aboriginal resource use probably violated Aboriginal rights in many instances. For
evidence of this in relation to the herring spawn on kelp fishery, see Harris, supra note 25.
36. For more detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, "The Vulnerability of Aboriginal Land Rights in
Canada and Australia" in Andrew Buck, John McLaren and Nancy Wright, eds., Property Rights in
the Colonial Imagination and Experience (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press)
[forthcoming] [hereinafter "Vulnerability"].
37. The explanation for this was that the trial took place before the Sparrov decision laid down the
justification test: see Gladstone, supra note 7 at para. 77.
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infringement of the appellants' Aboriginal right to harvest and sell commercial
quantities of herring spawn on kelp could be justified.
III MCLACHLIN J.'S VIEWS BEFORE SHE BECAME CHIEF JUSTICE
McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote her own judgment in Gladstone, in which
she agreed that a new trial was necessary, but for reasons different from those of
Lamer C.J. In her opinion, "the [A]boriginal right to trade in herring spawn on
kelp from the Bella Bella region [the Heiltsuk territory] is limited to such trade
as secures the modem equivalent of sustenance: the basics of food, clothing and
housing, supplemented by a few amenities."38 She thus defined the right more
narrowly than the Chief Justice. She also disagreed with the majority on the
issue of infringement, which in her view had not been established on the
evidence. As she found that a new trial was necessary to decide this issue, she
did not deal with justification, other than to observe:
If infringement were established at a new trial, the question of whether such an
infringement was justified should be decided at that point, according to the
principles set out in Van der Peet.39
Given that Lamer C.J. did not discuss the issue of justification in Van der Peet,
the principles McLachlin J. had in mind must have been those in her own
dissenting judgment in that case. To understand her position on justification, we
therefore need to retum to Van der Peet.
McLachlin J. began by addressing the question of whether Dorothy Van der
Peet had established an Aboriginal fishing right within the meaning of s.35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982. Speaking generally, she said the significance of
s.35(1) is twofold: first, it entrenches Aboriginal rights in the Constitution so
that, henceforth, "these rights can be limited only by treaty"; and second, it
recognizes "the right of [A]boriginal peoples to fair recognition of [A]boriginal
rights and settlement of [A]boriginal claims."4 After assessing the significance
of s.35(1) in this way, she offered the following comments on Lamer C.J.'s view
that the section's purpose is to achieve reconciliation:
38. Ibid at para. 165. Note that Harris, supra note 25 at 230, thought that the words "from the Bella
Bella region" hinted at a territorial limitation on the right that is not present in Lamer C.J.'s
judgment: see note 29. See also Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 277, where McLachlin J. said: "If
an [Alboriginal people can establish that it traditionally fished in a certain area, it continues to have
a similar right to do so, barring extinguishment or treaty" [emphasis added]. In her dissent in that
case, she found that the Sto:lo Nation have an Aboriginal right to take fish from the Fraser River for
sustenance purposes: ibid. at para. 282. See also Mitchell v. MN.R., supra note 16, esp. at paras. 55-
60, where she did place a geographical limitation on a claimed right to trade.
39. Gladstone, supra note 7 at para. 174.
40. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 229.
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It may not be wrong to assert, as the Chief Justice does, that the dual purposes of
s.35(1) are first to recognize the fact that the land was occupied prior to European
settlement and second, to reconcile the assertion of sovereignty with this prior
occupation. But it is, with respect, incomplete. As the foregoing passages from
Sparrow attest,[4 ] s.35(l) recognizes not only prior [A]boriginal occupation, but
also a prior legal regime giving rise to [A]boriginal rights which persist, absent
extinguishment. And it seeks not only to reconcile these claims with European
settlement and sovereignty but also to reconcile them in a way that provides the
basis for a just and lasting settlement of [Alboriginal claims consistent with the high
standard which the law imposes on the Crown in its dealings with [AJboriginal
peoples.
42
She then repeated the Court's view in Sparrow that, as a consequence of s.35(1),
[f]ederal power is to be reconciled with [Alboriginal rights by means of the doctrine
of justification. The federal government can legislate to limit the exercise of
[A]boriginal rights, but only to the extent that the limitation is justified and only in
accordance with the high standard of honourable dealing which the Constitution and
the law imposed on the government in its relations with [A]boriginals.4'
Unlike Lamer C.J., McLachlin J. did not rely on constitutional recognition and
the concept of reconciliation to limit the scope of Aboriginal rights. And while
agreeing with him that an activity, to qualify as an Aboriginal right, "must be an
element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the
[A]boriginal group claiming the right,"" she was critical of his elaboration of the
"integral to the distinctive culture" test. 5 Instead, she preferred to take what she
called an "empirical historical approach"46 to the definition of Aboriginal rights:
In my view, the better approach to defining [Alboriginal fights is an empirical
approach. Rather than attempting to describe a priori what an Aboriginal right is, we
should look to history to see what sorts of practices have been identified as
[A]boriginal fights in the past. From this we may draw inferences as to the sort of
things which may qualify as [A]boriginal rights under s.35(l). Confronted by a
particular claim, we should ask, "Is this like the sort of thing which the law has
41. In the previous paragraph, McLachlin J. had quoted the following from Sparrow, supra note 2 at
1105:
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 represents the culmination of a long and difficult
struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of
[A]boriginal rights. The strong representations of [N]ative associations and other groups
concerned with the welfare of Canada's [A]boriginal peoples made the adoption of
s.35(l) possible ... Section 35(1), at the least, provides a solid constitutional base upon
which subsequent negotiations can take place. It also affords [A]boriginal peoples
constitutional protection against provincial legislative power.
42. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 230 [emphasis added].
43. Ibid. at para. 231. See also text accompanying note 2.
44. Ibid. at para. 255, quoting from Lamer C.J.'s judgment at para. 46.
45. Ibid. at paras. 255-59.
46. Ibid., heading before para. 260 [italics removed and upper case replaced with lower case].
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recognized in the past?" This is the time-honoured methodology of the common
law.
47
McLachlin J. found evidence in the Royal Proclamation of 17638 and the Indian
treaties of
the acceptance by the colonizers of the principle that the [A]boriginal peoples who
occupied what is now Canada were regarded as possessing the [A]boriginal right to
live off their lands and the resources found in their forests and streams to the extent
they had traditionally done so. The fundamental understanding-the Grundnorm of
settlement in Canada-was that the [A]boriginal people could only be deprived of
the sustenance they traditionally drew from the land and adjacent waters by solemn
treaty with the Crown, on terms that would ensure to them and to their successors a
replacement for the livelihood that their lands, forests and streams had since
ancestral times provided them.49
She concluded that the fundamental right of the Aboriginal peoples to use the
land as they had traditionally done for sustenance is "enshrined in s.35(1)." °
Applying this general approach to Aboriginal fishing rights, she expressed the
view that trade in fish could be engaged in to provide for sustenance in the
present-day if that is "the only way of using the resource to provide the modem
equivalent of what they traditionally took."' Apparently, then, Aboriginal people
do not have to prove that trade in fish was a traditional practice as long as they
can establish that they derived sustenance from fishing. 2 Once that is
established, their present-day right to sustenance can involve trade "to provide
basic housing, transportation, clothing and amenities-the modem equivalent of
what the [A]boriginal people in question formerly took from the land or the
fishery."53 As the evidence in Van der Peet established both that the Sto:lo had
used fish from the Fraser River for centuries to sustain themselves and that the
scale of fishing involved in the case was well within the quantity required for a
moderate livelihood, and since the Crown had failed to prove extinguishment,
47. Ibid. at para. 261 [emphasis in original].
48. R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1.
49. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 272.
50. Ibid. at para. 275.
51. Ibid. at para. 278. Note that McLachlin J. rejected the distinction Lamer C.J. drew between
commercial fishing and small-scale exchange of fish for money and other goods. For her, any sale of
fish is commercial. See ibid. at paras. 233-37.
52. She drew a distinction between Aboriginal rights, which should be defined broadly and which
remain constant, and the exercise of those rights, which "may take many forms and vary from place
to place and from time to time": ibid. at para. 238. Note, however, that for her not all Aboriginal
people who fished historically would have a right to derive sustenance from fishing, as occasional
fishing for food or sport "would not support a right to fish for purposes of sale, much less to fish to
the extent needed to provide a moderate livelihood": ibid. at para. 279.
53. Her judgment in Gladstone is consistent with this: see note 38 and accompanying text.
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McLachlin J. found that Dorothy Van der Peet had been exercising an existing
Aboriginal right when she sold the fish."
As mentioned above, reconciliation was not really a factor in McLachlin J.'s
approach to the identification and definition of Aboriginal rights. In her view,
these rights arose from pre-existing Aboriginal customs and laws," which the
common law recognized. 6 We have seen that, for her, the purposes of s.35(1)
were "to preclude extinguishment and to provide a firm foundation for
settlement of [A]boriginal claims." 7 She therefore addressed the issue of
reconciliation mainly in the context of justification of infringement of Aboriginal
rights. In this respect, her criticisms of Chief Justice Lamer's approach in
Gladstone were devastating.
After finding that a prima facie infringement of Dorothy Van der Peet's
Aboriginal fishing right had been established, McLachlin J. turned to the issue of
justification, which she said involved "an inquiry into the extent the state can
limit the exercise of the right on the ground of policy." 8 Her use of the words
"limit the exercise of the right" is significant because she thought that, in the
context of the fishing right in question, s.35(1) had taken away the authority of
Parliament to limit the right itself.59 Post-s.35(l), non-Aboriginal regulatory
power has been limited to conservation of the resource and other compelling and
substantial objectives, such as prevention of harm to Aboriginal people and
others." More generally, she said that "the Crown may prohibit exploitation of
the resource that is incompatible with its continued and responsible use."'" While
she did envisage that "future cases may endorse limitation of [A]boriginal rights
on other bases," she said that, "[flor the purposes of this case ... it may be
ventured that the range of permitted limitation of an established [A]boriginal
right is confined to the exercise of the right rather than the diminution,
extinguishment or transfer of the right to others.""
54. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at paras. 282-95.
55. She also rejected Lamer C.J.'s pre-contact time frame. For her, the traditional laws and customs that
give rise to Aboriginal rights are those that "held sway before superimposition of European laws and
customs," which in some cases occurred long after contact: ibid. at para. 248.
56. Ibid. at paras. 261-69.
57. Ibid. at para. 232, summarizing her views on the significance of s.35(l). See notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
58. Ibid at para. 301.
59. See ibid. at paras. 238-42, where she distinguished between Aboriginal rights and the exercise of
those rights.
60. Ibid. at para. 305, relying on Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1113.
61. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 302. McLachlin J.'s use of the word "Crown" in this context is
problematic, as it might suggest that the executive branch of government can regulate the
constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples. Legislative authority apart, this cannot be so, as even
the common law protects legal rights against the prerogative power of the Crown: see Kent McNeil,
"Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion"
(2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 301. See also note 3. So what McLachlin J. probably had in mind
was the Crown acting through Parliament or exercising authority delegated to it by Parliament.
62. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 306 [emphasis in original].
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Focusing on Lamer C.J.'s majority judgment in Gladstone, McLachlin J.
observed:
Having defined the right at issue in such a way that it possesses no internal limits,
the Chief Justice compensates by adopting a large view of justification which cuts
back the right on the ground that this is required for reconciliation and social
harmony: Gladstone, at paras. 73 to 75. I would respectfully decline to adopt this
concept of justification for three reasons. First, it runs counter to the authorities, as I
understand them. Second, it is indeterminate and ultimately more political than
legal. Finally, if the right is more circumspectly defined, as I propose, this expansive
definition of justification is not required.63
Regarding the authorities, McLachlin J. compared the compelling and substantial
legislative objectives of conservation and safety referred to in Sparrow with the
economic, regional, and non-Aboriginal interests mentioned by Lamer C.J. in
Gladstone:
The extension of the concept of compelling objective to matters like economic and
regional fairness and the interests of non-[A]boriginal fishers ... would negate the
very [A]boriginal right to fish itself, on the ground that this is required for the
reconciliation of [A]boriginal rights and other interests and the consequent good of
the community as a whole. This is not limitation required for the responsible
exercise of the right, but rather limitation on the basis of the economic demands of
non-[A]boriginals. It is a limitation of a different order than the conservation, harm
prevention type of limitation sanctioned in Sparrow.'
McLachlin J. found that Chief Justice Lamer deviated from Sparrow in regard to
the second aspect of the justification test as well, namely, respect for the
Crown's fiduciary obligations. She said this:
The duty of a fiduciary, or trustee, is to protect and conserve the interest of the
person whose property is entrusted to him. In the context of [Alboriginal rights, this
requires that the Crown not only preserve the [A]boriginal people's interest, but also
manage it well: Guerin.[65] The Chief Justice's test, however, would appear to
permit the constitutional [A]boriginal fishing right to be conveyed by regulation,
law or executive act to non-[N]ative fishers who have historically fished in the area
in the interests of community harmony and reconciliation of [A]boriginal and non-
[A]boriginal interests.66
For her, then, Lamer C.J.'s approach was inconsistent with the Crown's
fiduciary obligations and undermined the priority that Aboriginal rights are
supposed to enjoy because they are constitutionally protected.67
63. Ibid. at para. 302.
64. Ibid at para. 306 [emphasis added].
65. Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
66. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 307.
67. Ibid. at paras. 307-8.
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McLachlin J.'s second objection to the Chief Justice's approach to
justification was that "it is indeterminate and ultimately may speak more to the
politically expedient than to legal entitlement."68 She elaborated as follows:
"In the right circumstances," themselves undefined, governments may abridge
[Alboriginal rights on the basis of an undetermined variety of considerations. While
"account" must be taken of the [N]ative interest and the Crown's fiduciary
obligation, one is left uncertain as to what degree. At the broadest reach, whatever
the government of the day deems necessary in order to reconcile [A]boriginal and
non-[A]boriginal interests might pass muster. In narrower incarnations, the result
will depend on doctrine yet to be determined. Upon challenge in the courts, the
focus will predictably be on the social justifiability of the measure rather than the
rights guaranteed.69
She then turned to her third reason for disagreeing with the Chief Justice and
addressed the issue of reconciliation directly in a passage that deserves to be
quoted at length:
My third observation is that the proposed departure from the principle of
justification elaborated in Sparrow is unnecessary to provide the "reconciliation" of
[A]boriginal and non-[A]boriginal interests which is said to require it. The Chief
Justice correctly identifies reconciliation between [A]boriginal and non-[A]boriginal
communities as a goal of fundamental importance. The desire for reconciliation, in
many cases long overdue, lay behind the adoption of s.35(l) of the Constitution Act,
1982. As Sparrow recognized, one of the two fundamental purposes of s.35(1) was
the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of [A]boriginal claims. The Chief
Justice also correctly notes that such a settlement must be founded on reconciliation
of [A]boriginal rights with the larger non-[A]boriginal culture in which they must,
of necessity, find their exercise ... . The question is how this reconciliation of the
different legal cultures of [Alboriginal and non-[Alboriginal peoples is to be
accomplished More particularly, does the goal of reconciliation of [Alboriginal
and non-[Alboriginal interests require that we permit the Crown to require a
judicially authorized transfer of the [Aiboriginal right to non-[Ajboriginals without
the consent of the [Ajboriginal people, without treaty, and without compensation? I
cannot think it does.0
McLachlin J. observed that her own historical approach to the definition of
Aboriginal rights would generally limit them to "the basics of food, clothing and
housing, supplemented by a few amenities," as Aboriginal societies generally
did not value "excess or accumulated wealth."'" So if this approach is adopted,
the right imposes its own internal limit-equivalence with what by ancestral law and
custom the [A]boriginal people in question took from the resource. The government
68. Ibid. at para. 309.
69. Ibid. at para. 309.
70. Ibid. at para. 310 [emphasis added].
71. Ibid. at para. 311. See also notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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may impose additional limits under the rubric of justification to ensure that the right
is exercised responsibly and in a way that preserves it for future generations. There
is no need to impose further limits on it to effect reconciliation between [A]boriginal
and non-[A]boriginal peoples."
McLachlin J. gave another reason for rejecting Lamer C.J.'s broad approach to
justification: for her, the reconciliation he envisaged could be achieved in a way
that was more in accord with Canada's historical relationship with the
Aboriginal peoples and more respectful of constitutional principles. She
observed that the way Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal perspectives on Aboriginal
rights have generally been reconciled is by negotiated treaties. In her own words:
It is for the [A]boriginal peoples and the other peoples of Canada to work out a just
accommodation of the recognized [A]boriginal rights. This process-definition of
the rights guaranteed by s.35(l) followed by negotiated settlements-is the means
envisaged in Sparrow, as I perceive it, for reconciling [A]boriginal and non-
[A]boriginal perspectives. It has not as yet been tried in the case of the Sto:lo. A
century and one-half after European settlement, the Crown has yet to conclude a
treaty with them. Until we have exhausted the traditional means by which
[A]boriginal and non-[A]boriginal legal perspectives may be reconciled, it seems
difficult to assert that it is necessary for the courts to suggest more radical methods
of reconciliation possessing the potential to erode [A]boriginal rights seriously."
Then, in her most biting criticism of all, McLachlin J. characterized Chief Justice
Lamer's approach to justification as unconstitutional:
The Chief Justice's proposal comes down to this. In certain circumstances,
[A]boriginals may be required to share their fishing rights with non-[A]boriginals in
order to effect a reconciliation of [A]boriginal and non-[A]boriginal interests. In
other words, the Crown may convey a portion of an [Alboriginal fishing right to
others, not by treaty or with the consent of the [A]boriginal people, but by its own
unilateral act .... How, without amending the Constitution, can the Crown cut down
the [A]boriginal right? The exercise of the rights guaranteed by s.35(1) is subject to
reasonable limitation to ensure that they are used responsibly. But the rights
themselves can be diminished only through treaty and constitutional amendment. To
reallocate the benefit of the right from [A]boriginals to non-[A]boriginals, would be
to diminish the substance of the right that s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982
guarantees to the [A]boriginal people. This no court can do.74
Applying her own approach to justification to the facts, she concluded that the
infringement of Dorothy Van der Peet's Aboriginal right to sell fish for
sustenance purposes had not been justified.
72. Ibid. at para. 312.
73. Ibid. at para. 313.
74. Ibid. at para. 315.
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IV ANALYSIS OF THESE DIVERGENT VIEWS OF RECONCILIATION
With all due respect, I find McLachlin J.'s critique of Chief Justice Lamer's
conception of reconciliation and of his approach to justification to be right on the
mark. As conceived by the Chief Justice, reconciliation does not involve
resolution of conflicts between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests by
means of negotiations and mutually acceptable agreements. Instead, he used it
primarily to justify unilateral governmental infringement of Aboriginal rights for
the benefit of other Canadians. I think McLachlin J. correctly portrayed this as
an unconstitutional attempt to achieve "social harmony" or "societal peace."75
But if social harmony and peace depend on violation of the constitutional rights
of the Aboriginal peoples, what does this say about Canadian society? Are non-
Aboriginal Canadians really so mean-spirited? Would we accept violation of our
constitutional rights because respect for them might threaten social harmony?
Would we not seek to achieve social harmony and peace in ways that did not
involve violation of fundamental rights?
If Lamer C.J. was right that respect for Aboriginal rights might undermine
social harmony and peace, then surely what is needed is not more erosion of
those rights, but greater public understanding of their historical and legal bases.
Governments that share the Chief Justice's concern should be directing their
energies in that direction, rather than seeking to justify further infringements of
Aboriginal rights. Moreover, even if some Canadians might favour their own
economic and regional interests over the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal
peoples, one needs to be aware of the potential reactions of the Aboriginal
peoples to further violation of their rights. Many of them are likely to view
court-sanctioned infringement of their rights as an illegitimate erosion of the
constitutional protection that they thought they had achieved in 1982.76 While
Aboriginal people to date have shown remarkable patience and restraint, future
generations may not be so tolerant of continuing violation of their rights. The
social harmony that Lamer C.J. sought may thus be put in jeopardy from the
Aboriginal side, especially in parts of Canada where demographics favour the
Aboriginal peoples. Surely, as McLachlin J. suggested, the chances of achieving
social harmony and peace would be greater if solutions leading to bilateral
resolution of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests by treaty were negotiated
rather than imposed.
It would be unfair, however, to expect certain segments of Canadian society
to pay a greater price than other Canadians for protection of Aboriginal rights. In
situations, therefore, where government failure to respect Aboriginal rights in the
past has resulted in tension between those rights and the interests of a particular
group, such as non-Aboriginal commercial fishers, it is appropriate for the
government in question to compensate the members of that group for any real
losses they might suffer as a consequence of respecting those rights today. So
75. Ibid. at paras. 302, 316. See quotations from her judgment accompanying notes 63 and 66.
76. See the quotation from Sparrow in note 41.
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where commercial fishing licences were issued to non-Aboriginal persons, for
example, in the expectation that they would utilize fishery resources, and it turns
out that in so doing they have been violating Aboriginal rights, the government
that issued the licences should be prepared to compensate them." The obvious
reason for this is that the cost of respecting Aboriginal rights should be borne by
all Canadians, rather than by particular segments of Canadian society whose
interests must give way to those rights.
Quite apart from the disturbing and possibly false assumptions that underlay
the apparent view of Lamer C.J. that reconciliation requires Aboriginal rights to
yield in order to preserve social harmony and peace, as McLachlin J. pointed out
there are also serious constitutional objections to governmental authority that
permits the redistribution of the substance of Aboriginal rights to other
Canadians. If constitutional entrenchment means anything, it must protect
Aboriginal rights against government actions that are designed, not to achieve
overriding public objectives like conservation and safety that are essential for the
preservation of Aboriginal rights and the well-being of all Canadians, but to
benefit the private interests of certain segments of Canadian society such as
commercial fishers. A useful comparison can be drawn here between
infringement of Aboriginal rights and expropriation of property. Although
legislatures have the constitutional authority in Canada to expropriate non-
Aboriginal property for the benefit of private persons,78 they usually do not do
so. Instead, expropriation statutes restrict governmental taking of property to
public purposes, such as provision of roads and airports," as it is generally
regarded to be inappropriate for governments to take the property of some
citizens for the private benefit of others.8" And yet, as McLachlin J. pointed out,
that is exactly what Chief Justice Lamer seems to have envisaged in Gladstone
when he said that Aboriginal fishing rights might be infringed so that some of
the resource could be apportioned among other users. This would be disturbing
enough if Aboriginal rights were simply protected by the common law. But
given their constitutional status, it is a startling revelation of Lamer C.J.'s
77. This would be in addition to compensation payable to the Aboriginal people in question for violation
of their fishing rights up to the time they were accorded respect: see generally Robert Mainville, An
Overview of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and Compensation for Their Breach (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2001).
78. This is because in Canada, unlike in the United States, private property is not constitutionally
protected: see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right" in
Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme Court's
Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2000) 55 at 56-57 [hereinafter "Aboriginal
Title"], reprinted in Emerging Justice, supra note 4, 292 at 293-95.
79. See generally Eric C. E. Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1992).
80. Taxation for the purpose of creating a social safety net might be regarded as an exception to this,
though it can be argued that the objective of providing a minimum standard of living to all members
of Canadian society is itself a public purpose.
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opinion of the value of those rights relative to the rights and interests of other
Canadians.8'
V FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS: DELGAMUUKW AND MARSHALL
While space does not permit detailed discussion of the jurisprudential impact of
Chief Justice Lamer's conceptualization of reconciliation and his approach to
justification in subsequent cases, brief mention should be made of the Supreme
Court's decisions in the Delgamuukw82 and Marshall cases." In each of these
cases, the Court not only affirmed these aspects of Lamer C.J.'s judgment in
Gladstone, but also extended their application to other circumstances.
After defining Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw as an exclusive, proprietary
"right to the land itself,"8 and laying down guidelines for proof that diverged
significantly from the "integral to the distinctive culture" test,85 Chief Justice
Lamer, who once again wrote the principal judgment, 6 turned to the test for
justification of infringements of Aboriginal title. He reviewed this aspect of the
Sparrow and Gladstone decisions, quoting passages from his judgment in the
latter case where he had relied on the concept of reconciliation to justify limiting
Aboriginal rights. 7 He repeated as well that valid legislative objectives for
infringement include "the pursuit of economic and regional fairness" and "the
recognition of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by
non-[A]boriginal groups." 8 Applying the same general approach to justification
of infringements of Aboriginal title, he said this:
In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the
infringement of [A]boriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be
traced to the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by
[A]boriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the
recognition that "distinctive [A]boriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a
broader social, political and economic community" (at para. 73). In my opinion, the
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement
of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are
81. For further discussion, see "Vulnerability", supra note 36.
82. Supra note 6.
83. Marshall [No. 1], supra note 3; Marshall [No. 2], supra note 3.
84. Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 138. See also paras. 113, 117 and 140 and discussion in
"Aboriginal Title", supra note 78.
85. See "Aboriginal Rights", supra note 16 at 261-77 (Emerging Justice, supra note 4 at 66-8 1).
86. La Forest J., L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurring, arrived at the same result in a separate judgment.
McLachlin J. concurred with Lamer C.J., adding that she was "also in substantial agreement with the
comments of Justice La Forest": Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 209.
87. Ibid. at paras. 161-64. Passages from Gladstone that he relied upon included those quoted in the text
accompanying notes 30 and 33.
88. Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 161, quoting from Gladstone, supra note 7 at para. 75.
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consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of
[A]boriginal title. 9
Quite apart from the serious division-of-powers problems presented by this list
of potentially valid legislative objectives," one can see how the Chief Justice
used the concept of reconciliation to envisage justification of almost any kind of
infringement of Aboriginal title. Even "the conferral of fee simples for
agriculture, and of leases and licences for forestry and mining" on Aboriginal
title lands, was contemplated by him.' So despite its constitutional status,
Aboriginal title has been rendered more vulnerable than common law real
property interests, 2 all in the name of reconciliation.
The Marshall case involved treaty rather than Aboriginal rights. However,
as both received the same constitutional recognition and affirmation by s.35(l),
the Supreme Court has used the same test for justification of infringements. 3
Donald Marshall Jr., who had caught and sold 463 pounds of eels to support
himself and his spouse, was charged with illegal taking and sale of fish. In
Marshall [No. 1], Binnie J., for a majority of the Court, held that Mr. Marshall,
as a member of the Mi'kmaq Nation that had entered into a treaty with the
Crown in 1760-1761, had a right to exchange fish for "necessaries.94 Binnie J.
characterized this treaty right in a modem-day context as a right to obtain a
"moderate livelihood" from fishing, which he said, "includes such basics as
'food, clothing and housing, supplemented by a few amenities', but not the
accumulation of wealth."" Significantly, this characterization came from
McLachlin J.'s definition of the Aboriginal fishing right in Gladytone,9' which
was not accepted by the majority in that case.97 But in Marshall [No. 1], of
89. Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 165 [emphasis in original].
90. For detailed discussion of these problems, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Division of
Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431, reprinted in
Emerging Justice, supra note 4, 249 and "Aboriginal Title and Section 88 of the Indian Act" (2000)
34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159; Nigel Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and
Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317;
Kerry Wilkins, "Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185 and "'Still Crazy After
All These Years': Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty" (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458.
91. Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 167. How Lamer C.J. was able to reconcile "the conferral of fee
simples" with his own statement in Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 28, that "[s]ubsequent to
s.35(1) [A]boriginal rights cannot be extinguished" is a good question, unless he thought that
Aboriginal title and fee simple estates could co-exist.
92. For critical commentary, see Defining Aboriginal, supra note 6; "Vulnerability", supra note 36;
"Aboriginal Title", supra note 78.
93. See e.g. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at paras. 13-14 (Sopinka J.), 75-79, 96 (Cory J.); R. v.
C6tg, supra note 11 at para. 81 (Lamer C.J.); R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393 at para. 38 (Cory
J.). For critical commentary, see Leonard I. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights,
Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149.
94. Marshall [No. 1], supra note 3 at para. 58.
95. Ibid. at para. 59, quoting from Gladstone, supra note 7 at para. 165 (McLachlin J.).
96. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
97. See Marshall [No. 1], supra note 3 at para. 60.
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course, the extent of the right depended on interpretation of the treaty, not on the
test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights. It is also noteworthy that
McLachlin J., Gonthier J. concurring, dissented in Marshall [No. 1]. She held
the view that the treaty right was not a general right to trade, but depended on
trading posts known as 'truckhouses' or the system of licenced traders that
replaced them. When those trading outlets ceased to exist in the 1780s, the treaty
right disappeared as well.
The majority in Marshall [No. 1] found that the treaty right to derive a
moderate livelihood from fishing was a general right that had not disappeared
and that there had been a prima facie infringement of it by regulations made
under the federal Fisheries Act."9 As the Crown had made no attempt to justify
the infringement, Mr. Marshall was acquitted. Because justification was not an
issue, the Supreme Court did not address it in Marshall [No. 1]. Binnie J. simply
observed that the treaty right is subject "to regulations that can be justified."99
Marshall [No. 2] arose from an application by an intervener in Marshall
[No. 1], the West Nova Fishermen's Coalition, for a rehearing on the federal
government's regulatory authority over the east coast fisheries, a new trial on the
matter of justificatory infringement of the treaty right and a stay of the Marshall
[No. 1] judgment in the meantime. In dismissing the application the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous by-the-Court judgment, elaborated on several aspects of
its decision in Marshall [No. 1]. The issue of justification figured prominently in
this "clarification" of its earlier decision. The Court pointed out that this was a
separate issue that had not been dealt with because the Crown had chosen to lead
no evidence on it.' The Court nonetheless emphasized that, as mentioned
several times in Marshall [No. 1], the treaty right was subject to justifiable
infringement.
In its discussion of justifiable infringement in Marshall [No. 2], the Court
referred to Gladstone and quoted the passage in which "the pursuit of economic
and regional fairness, and the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and
participation in, the fishery by non-[A]boriginal groups," were accepted as valid
legislative objectives, as "such objectives are in the interest of all Canadians
and, more importantly, the reconciliation of [Alboriginal societies with the rest
of Canadian society may well depend on their successful attainment."'' The
Court continued:
This observation applies with particular force to a treaty right. The [A]boriginal
right at issue in Gladstone, supra, was by definition exercised exclusively by
98. Supra note 9. See Marshall [No. 1], ibid. at paras. 62-65.
99. Marshall [No. 1], ibid. at para. 7. See also paras. 4, 56, 64 and 66. Binnie J. relied on R. v. Badger,
supra note 93, where the Court first applied the justificatory test to treaty rights: see discussion in
Rotman, supra note 93. See also Marshall [No. 2], supra note 3 at para. 32.
100. Marshall [No. 2], ibid. at paras. 2-3, 6, 14.
101. Ibid. at para. 41, quoting from Gladstone, supra note 7 at para. 75 [emphasis in original] (see text
accompanying note 34 for the full quotation).
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[A]boriginal people prior to contact with Europeans. As stated, no such exclusivity
ever attached to the treaty right at issue in this case. Although we note the
acknowledgment of the appellant Marshall that "non-[A]boriginal
regional/community dependencies ... may be taken into account in devising
regulatory schemes," and the statements in Gladstone, supra, which support this
view, the Court again emphasizes that the specifics of any particular regulatory
regime were not and are not before us for decision." 2
The reason the Court gave for the non-exclusivity of the treaty right was that
non-Aboriginal persons were participating in the fishery at the time the treaty
was entered into.' 3 Nonetheless, since the enactment of s.35(1) in 1982, the
treaty right has enjoyed constitutional protection and so is entitled to priority.'
The Court's reliance on the passage from Gladstone quoted in the preceding
paragraph reveals that reconciliation is the underlying rationale for allocation of
fishery resources among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal fishers, even if that
involves infringement of a treaty right to fish. What is odd about this is that
allocation was viewed as potentially justifiable in Gladstone because the fishing
right in that case had no internal limit, and so might be an exclusive right if it
were accorded complete priority, as the right to fish for food, societal and
ceremonial purposes had been in Sparrow. 5 Given that the majority in Marshall
[No. 1] held the treaty right to fish to be limited to obtaining a moderate
livelihood,' 6 it did have an internal limit. Also, like the fishing right in Sparrow
it was not exclusive. So the priority accorded to the treaty right in the Marshall
case should have been the priority that was accorded to the fishing right in
Sparrow, rather than the more limited priority accorded to the right in Gladstone.
One has to wonder whether the Supreme Court was spooked by the sometimes
violent reaction to Marshall [No. 1] in the Maritime Provinces"'? and so made
concessions to elements of the non-Aboriginal populace. Moreover, with respect
it seems inappropriate for the Court to have addressed such an important and
substantive issue in Marshall [No. 2] on an application for a rehearing,
especially when the matter was not even before the Court in Marshall [No. 1]. "'
We have seen that the disagreement between Chief Justice Lamer and
Justice McLachlin in Van der Peet and Gladstone related both to the scope of the
102. Marshall [No. 2], ibid. at para. 41 [emphasis in original].
103. Ibid. at para. 38.
104. Ibid. at paras. 6 and 45. While the Court did not refer directly to the priority of the fishing right in
Marshall [No. 2], we have seen that even Gladstone accorded limited priority to Aboriginal fishing
rights: see notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
105. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
106. See notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
107. See Ken S. Coates, The Marshall Decision and Native Rights (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2000); Leonard I. Rotman, "'My Hovercraft is Full of Eels': Smoking Out
the Message in R. v. Marshall" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 617.
108. See Bruce H. Wildsmith, "Vindicating Mi'kmaq Rights: The Struggle Before, During and After
Marshall" (1999/2000 Access to Justice Lecture, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, March
2000) [unpublished].
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fishing rights in question and to justification of their infringement. While Lamer
C.J. was willing to accept a generous definition of the commercial right in
Gladstone, he exposed that right to a broad governmental power of infringement.
McLachlin J. took a more restrictive approach to defining the rights in both Van
der Peet and Gladstone, limiting them to sustenance, which she equated with a
moderate livelihood. But she would not envisage infringement of those rights for
purposes other than ensuring the conservation of the resource and the
responsible exercise of the Aboriginal rights. She regarded measures that would
diminish the rights themselves by allocating part of the resource to non-
Aboriginal users as unconstitutional and hence unjustifiable.
In Marshall [No. 1], the majority interpreted the treaty right to fish as a right
to derive a moderate livelihood from fishing, just as McLachlin J. had defined
the Aboriginal rights in Van der Peet and Gladstone. And then in Marshall [No.
2], the Court said that the Gladstone test for justificatory infringement applies to
this more limited right. While the limited definition of the right arose from the
Court's interpretation of the treaty, the broad power of infringement that the
Court endorsed in Marshall [No. 2] again relates to reconciliation. It seems that
even a constitutional right to obtain a moderate livelihood from fishing can be
infringed, not just to ensure that the resource is conserved and responsibly used,
but also to allocate part of it to non-Aboriginal fishers in the interests of social
harmony and peace. Regrettably, this appears to be the end result of Chief
Justice Lamer's conception of reconciliation.'°9
VI CONCLUSION
Two months after the decision in Marshall [No. 2] was handed down, Beverley
McLachlin replaced Antonio Lamer as the Chief Justice of Canada. We have
seen that her views on reconciliation differ significantly from those of the former
Chief Justice. While she has generally taken a more restrictive approach than her
predecessor to the definition of Aboriginal and treaty rights, in her dissent in Van
der Peet she was adamant that the way to reconciliation is through the
consensual treaty process-it will not be achieved by unilateral diminution of the
rights of the Aboriginal peoples. After Van der Peet, however, McLachlin J. (as
she still was) concurred with Lamer C.J.'s decision in Delgamuukw and
participated in the by-the-Court decision in Marshall [No. 2], both of which
endorsed-and even extended-the approach to justifiable infringement
articulated by Lamer C.J. in Gladstone. Does this mean that she has given in on
this matter and acquiesced to his approach? Or is she biding her time and waiting
for an appropriate case to reopen the issue?
Since becoming Chief Justice, McLachlin has written only two judgments in
cases involving Aboriginal issues, neither of which cast further light on this
109. Lamer C.J. concurred with Binnie J. in Marshall [No. 1] and participated in the by-the-Court
judgment in Marshall [No. 2].
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question. In Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass,"' involving the valuation of leased
reserve land, she dissented in part, but as reconciliation was not an issue, the
case provides no indication of how she might deal with it in the future. The other
case, Mitchell v. MN.R.,"' involved a claim to an Aboriginal right to bring
goods from the United States into Canada for the purposes of trade with other
First Nations without paying duty. Writing the principal judgment, McLachlin
C.J. defined the right narrowly by limiting it geographically to north-south trade
across the St. Lawrence River, thereby undermining the evidentiary basis for the
right. This is consistent with her tendency to take a more restrictive approach to
the definition of Aboriginal rights than Chief Justice Lamer had done."2 Given,
however, her finding that the claimed right to trade had not been established, she
did not have to deal with justifiable infringement, over which she and Lamer C.J.
were so at odds in the context of reconciliation. She therefore did not refer to
reconciliation in Mitchell, other than to reiterate Lamer C.J.'s general view that
"s.35(l) is aimed at reconciling the prior occupation of North America by
[A]boriginal societies with the Crown's assertion of sovereignty. '"3
It might be thought that the Supreme Court would be deterred by the
doctrine of stare decisis from reopening the issue of the meaning of
reconciliation in the context of justifiable infringement. Significantly, however,
in none of the Aboriginal cases decided so far by the Court has infringement of
an Aboriginal or treaty right actually been held to be justified; instead, the Court
has either found no justification or sent the case back to trial to determine the
matter. Moreover, the Court clearly is not bound by its earlier decisions, and
although it has seldom explicitly acknowledged this fact, it has occasionally in
effect overruled its own precedents when it concluded that they were no longer
appropriate expressions of the law."' More commonly, the Court modifies the
law by distinguishing or limiting the scope of its earlier decisions. ' This is what
Lamer C.J. said he was doing in Gladstone when he modified the test for
justifiable infringement that had been laid down by Dickson C.J. and La Forest J.
in Sparrow."' We have seen, however, that McLachlin J. (as she then was)
disagreed. In her opinion, the test articulated by Lamer C.J. in Gladstone was
inconsistent with Sparrow."7 Moreover, she thought it was also unconstitutional
because it allowed the reallocation of the substance of an Aboriginal right from
110. (2000] 2 S.C.R. 633.
111. Supra note 16.
112. See note 38 and accompanying text. See also Marshall [No. 1], supra note 3, where, dissenting, she
interpreted a treaty right to fish more narrowly than the majority.
113. Mitchell v. MN.R., supra note 16 at para. 12. See also per Binnie J., concurring in result, at paras.
74, 76, 80, 123,129, 133,155, 164, 167.
114. See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Student ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 8.7.
115. For use of these methods by English courts, see generally Rupert Cross, Precedent in English Law,
3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
116. See notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
117. See text accompanying notes 63-67. For an illuminating article that explains and criticizes this
change in the law, see Christie, supra note 4.
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Aboriginal to non-Aboriginal people, which she said, "no court can do.""' Given
the evident strength of her views on this matter and the constitutional nature of
her disagreement with Chief Justice Lamer,"9 she may well be inclined to try to
move the Court back from Gladstone to the more appropriate position that was
unanimously expressed by the Court in Sparrow.
For the present, we will have to wait for the McLachlin Court to deal with
another case involving justifiable infringement. But regardless of whether the
current Chief Justice re-examines the issue, the weaknesses inherent in Lamer
C.J.'s understanding of reconciliation and approach to justification remain.
Subjecting Aboriginal and treaty rights to non-consensual redistribution of the
substance of those rights to other Canadians for purposes like the pursuit of
economic and regional fairness makes a mockery of the constitutional protection
that those rights are supposed to enjoy.
118. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 315 (The passage where these words appear is quoted at length in
the text accompanying note 74.).
119. In the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Western Australia v. Ward, [2002] H.C.A.
28, Kirby J., concurring in result, referred at para. 594 to the duty of a dissenting judge to accept the
opinion of the majority, until overturned by legislation or a subsequent majority of the Court itself,
"in matters of statute and common law." However, he went on to say at para. 598 that a dissenting
judge may adhere to his or her opinion "where the source of the dissent is the higher law of the
Constitution."
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